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Criminal Procedure
Criminal Procedure; disclosure
of grand jury testimony
Penal Code §924.6 (new).

AB 284 (Brown);

STATS

1975, Ch 34

Support: State Bar of California; California District Attorneys' Association; California Peace Officers' Association
Opposition: Attorney General
Chapter 34 adds Section 924.6 to the Penal Code to provide that a
court which has empaneled a grand jury shall, upon application of either
the defendant or the people, order disclosure of all or part of testimony
of witnesses, even though no indictment has been returned. Such an
order shall, be made in connection with pending or subsequent criminal
proceedings if the court determines, at an in camera hearing which shall
include a feview of the testimony, that the testimony is relevant and appears to be admissible. Prior to the addition of this section, a transcript
of grand jury testimony was prepared and made available to the parties
only when an indictment was returned.
COMMENT
The doctrine of secrecy of grand jury proceedings is generally considered to have its origins in the Earle of Shaftsbury Trial (8 How. St.

Tr. 759) decided in 1681 [J. WIGMORE, 8 EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW §2360 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)]. In that case the
grand jury insisted that its proceedings be conducted in private to avoid
control of its activities by the crown [Id.]. Thus it appears that the
original rationale for the doctrine of secrecy was to protect the jury and
the accused from abuses by the crown. As the government became less
distrusted, however, the original rationale declined in importance, and
it became common practice to permit the prosecutor to be present during
grand jury proceedings [Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REV.
455, 457-58 (1965)]. Modernly four reasons are given for maintaining grand jury secrecy: (1) to permit the grand jurors to perform their
duties free from apprehension; (2) to assure that witnesses will testify
willingly and freely; (3) to prevent the guilty accused from fleeing from
arrest or suborning perjury; and (4) to protect the innocent accused
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from the embarrassment of publication of the charges [J. WIGMORE, 8
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW

§2360 (McNaughton rev. ed.

1961)].
There exists today a widely recognized exception to the doctrine of
secrecy. Most jurisdictions permit the introduction of prior grand jury
testimony at trial for the purpose of impeaching a witness [Id. at §2363].
California has recognized this exception, in cases where an indictment
is returned, since 1897 [See Draper, State Experience Points the Way
for Improvement of Federal Criminal Procedure, 42 CAL. S.B.J. 34, 36
(1967)]. In that year, a statute [CAL. STATS. 1897, c. 142 at 204]
was enacted which permitted a district attorney to order that a transcript
of grand jury testimony be made and required that in such a case a copy
be given to the defendant upon his arraignment after indictment. A

1927 amendment

[CAL. STATS.

1927, c. 684 at 1156] required that

a transcript be made in all cases where an indictment was returned. The
provision requiring delivery of a copy to the defendant was retained.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 34, however, there was no provision
for the preparation of a transcript of grand jury testimony in cases where
no indictment was returned. Thus it appears that when no indictment
was returned, but the people proceeded against the defendant on a misdemeanor or separate felony charge arising from the same occurrence,
the defendant had no means to review a witness' testimony before the
grand jury for the purpose of impeachment at the trial.
In 1970 the Sacramento Grand Jury desired to deliver the results of
a bribery investigation to the Joint Legislative Committee on Ethics,
even though it had returned no indictment. In an opinion requested
by the Sacramento District Attorney, the Attorney General of California
advised that a grand jury transcript could not be made public nor given
to a government agency when no formal charge was made [53 Ops.
ATT'Y GEN. 200 (1970)]. The opinion cited the four commonly given
reasons for secrecy of grand jury proceedings set forth above [Id. at
202], and the then existing statutes which provided that a transcript be
prepared only when an indictment was returned [Id. at 201]. In 1973
a bill identical in substance to Chapter 34 [A.B. 1151, 1971 Regular
Session] was vetoed by then Governor Reagan. In the veto message,
the former Governor labeled the bill an "unnecessary and undesirable
expansion of the criminal process" [JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA
ASSEMBLY 9185 (1973 Reg. Sess.)]. It was argued that if the people
proceeded against the defendant on another theory, the defendant would
be adequately protected by having access to the grand jury proceedings
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leading to the subsequent indictment [Id.]. The Governor reiterated
the reasoning of the Attorney General, saying that secrecy is required
to encourage witnesses to testify freely and to protect those who are innocent from publication of the accusations [Id.].
It would seem that the rationale for nondisclosure of grand jury testimony as set forth by the Attorney General and the former Governor
is inapposite to the provisions of Chapter 34. While it appears that
the deliberationsof the jury must remain secret, it is difficult to understand how the jurors themselves will be threatened by the disclosure of
testimony given by a witness. Secondly, prior law already provided that
the testimony of a witness could be made public after an indictment was
returned [CAL. PEN. CODE §938.11. It is doubtful, therefore, that a
witness will be inhibited by the additional possibility of limited disclosure pursuant to Chapter 34. Fear of the accused fleeing arrest is not
a consideration, as the provisions of Chapter 34, by their own terms,
apply only when the accused is a party to a pending or subsequent criminal prosecution. There is no danger of the accused influencing testimony before the grand jury, as disclosures under Chapter 34 occur only
after that testimony has been heard. Nor is the danger of tampering .
with witnesses, at trial increased, as formerly the accused had the right
to know the names of the witnesses appearing against him [CAL. PEN.
CODE §§864, 865, 943]. There is little value in protecting the accused
from publication of the previous charges, as Chapter 34 disclosures arise
only when he or she stands accused of another crime. What value there
was in this protection would seem more than offset by the opportunity
of the accused to impeach adverse witnesses through the use of prior
grand jury testimony. It is true that under prior law a defendant had
access to the transcripts of the grand jury hearing which led to the pending or subsequent indictment [CAL. PEN. CODE §938.1]. It would seem,
however, that to provide full protection to the defendant it is necessary
that he or she be permitted to review all prior testimony of an adverse
witness relating to the occurrence for which he or she now stands trial.
the defendant is not the sole beneficiary of the provisions of this
chapter. The new section permits disclosure of testimony upon application of either party. Thus the chapter provides the prosecuting attorney
with a tool to insure that the testimony of his own witnesses remains
consistent. The prosecutor may also use grand jury testimony of the
accused against him or her at a subsequent trial [People v. LaRue, 28
Cal. App. 2d 748, 754, 83 P.2d 725, 728-29 (1938)].
It should be noted that Chapter 34 provides only a very limited excepPacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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tion to the doctrine of grand jury secrecy. There must be a pending
or subsequent criminal proceeding involving the same accused, the court
hearing the application for disclosure must sit in camera, and the testimony may be disclosed only if it is both admissible and relevant to the
pending or subsequent proceeding. Furthermore, the disclosure authorized by Chapter 34 may be constitutionally required. In Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co. v. United States [360 U.S. 395 (1959)], the Supreme
Court held that discovery of grand jury proceedings was discretionary
with the trial court judge [Id. at 401]. The Court's opinion did not
reach constitutional issues, however, and was limited to an interpretation
of Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure [Id. at 399].
In Brady v. Maryland [373 U.S. 83 (1963)] it was held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused which
is material to the issue of guilt or innocence of the defendant, is a violation of due process [Id. at 87]. Because the prosecutor is present during the presentation of evidence before the grand jury, such testimony
is known to him and therefore may fall within the Brady rule. Finally,.
in Davis v. Alaska [415 U.S. 308 (1974)1 it was held that the sixth
amendment right to confrontation is paramount to a state policy of confidentiality of juvenile criminal records [Id. at 309]. In that case the
defendant wished to impeach a juvenile witness by use of the minor's
criminal record to show an ulterior motive for his identification of the
defendant [id. at 311]. By analogy, it seems that the right to confrontation as guaranteed by the sixth amendment may also be paramount
to the confidentiality of grand jury proceedings.
Criminal Procedure; grand jury reports
Penal Code §939.91 (new).
AB 1044 (Chel); STATS 1975, Ch 467
Support: City of Long Beach; California Organization of Police and
Sheriffs
Opposition: California District Attorneys' Association; California
Peace Officers' Association
Section 939.91 has been added to the Penal Code to provide that
when a grand jury investigation is completed and no indictment is returned, the person who was the subject of that investigation may request
the grand jury to declare that charges against him or her were investigated and dismissed. The new section further provides that a person
called as a witness before a grand jury may request a declaration that
his or her appearance before that body was exclusively as a witness and
Selected 1975 California Legislation
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did not involve charges against him or her. If requested and approved
by the court which impaneled the grand jury, these declarations must
be made by the grand jury at the completion of its investigation, and
in no event later than the end of the grand jury's term.
Prior statutory law did not specifically prohibit reports of this nature,
and there is case law which appears to have permitted such reports. In
Irwin v. Murphy [129 Cal. App. 713, 19 P.2d 292 (1933)], for example, it was held that a grand jury may report the results of an investigation even when no indictment or presentment is returned [Id. at 717,
19 P.2d at 293]. While that case concerned a report of misconduct,
the court stated that "[tihe duty of a grand jury is to protect the citizen
against unfounded accusation" [d.]. Arguably there exists in the
mind of the public an implied accusation in the simple fact that one is
called before a grand jury. Thus, under former law, it appears that
declarations of this nature could have been issued at the discretion of
the jury. The new section makes such declarations mandatory when
requested by a witness or the accused and approved by the court which
impaneled the grand jury.
Criminal Procedure; arrest records
Labor Code §432.7 (amended); Penal Code § 11105 (repealed),
§§849.5, 851.8, 11105, Article 6 (commencing with §13300)
(new); §§851.6, 11105.5, 11115, 11116, 11120, 11140 (amended).
SB 299 (Moscone); STATS 1975, Ch 904
Opposition: Attorney General; California District Attorneys' Association; California Peace Officers' Association
AB 1277 (Sieroty); STATs 1975, Ch 1117
Support: California Trial Lawyers Association; League of California
Cities
AB 1674 (Lockyer); STATS 1975, Ch 1222
A record of an arrest may bar a person from public and private employment even though he or she is subsequently found to be innocent
of the charges for which arrested [Karabian, Record of Arrest: The
Indelible Stain, 3 PAC. L.J. 20, 21 (1972)]. Chapters 904 and 1117
appear to be attempts by the legislature to protect an innocent person
from the adverse effects of an arrest record. Chapter 904 has added
Section 851.8 to the Penal Code to permit the trial judge, upon the motion of any party, to order the sealing of all records concerning the case,
including arrest and detention records, when the defendant has been acPacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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quitted and it appears to the presiding judge that the defendant is "factually innocent of the charge." If such an order is made, the judge must
inform the defendant of his right to thereafter state that he was not arrested for the charge, and that he was found innocent of the charge.
Chapter 1117 has added Section 849.5 to the Penal Code to protect
those persons who are arrested but against whom no charges are filed.
The new Section 849.5 provides that when a person is arrested and released, and no accusatory pleadings are filed, any record made of the
arrest must indicate that the person was released. In addition, Penal
Code Section 851.6 has been amended to require that when a person
is arrested, released, and no accusatory pleadings are filed, the person
arrested shall be given a certificate by the arresting agency which describes the action taken as a "detention." Furthermore, the records of
the arresting agency and the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation must be altered so as to refer to the action taken as a detention.
Chapter 1222 has repealed the previously existing provisions of Penal
Code § 11105 and has added a new Penal Code Section 11105 to require
the Department of Justice to establish and maintain a "state summary
criminal history information." The contents of this summary shall be
made available to the state courts, various law enforcement agencies,
probation and parole officers, public defenders and defendants' attorneys of record, and to any state, city, or county agency when the
information is required to implement a statute or regulation. Certain
other persons and agencies, such as federal peace officers and federal
courts, may also be furnished information from the summary upon a
showing of compelling need. Chapter 1222 further requires local criminal justice agencies to establish a "local summary criminal history information" by January 1, 1978. Information from this summary may
be disseminated in the same manner as that from the state summary.
COMMENT
By providing for the sealing of criminal records, Chapter 904 amply
protects the person who is found "factually innocent" from the stigma
of a criminal record. In providing this protection, however, the chapter
appears to create serious problems in regard to the person who is acquitted but who is not found to be factually innocent. Because the criminal
records of the "factually innocent" person may be sealed, there may arise
in the minds of many a logical inference that the person whose records
have not been sealed has been found "factually guilty" by the court, and
Selected 1975 California Legislation
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that such person's acquittal was obtained merely by the procedural maneuvering of an attorney. While criminal penalties may not be imposed
based upon this determination, the branding of a person as "factually
guilty" may bar the person from certain types of employment and cause
irreparable damage to his or her standing in the community. The social
stigma involved may be even greater than that which attaches to the person who was convicted and has subsequently "paid his debt to society"
and has been rehabilitated. In spite of the harm which may occur to
a person as a result of not being found "factually innocent," Chapter
904 provides no guidance as to the manner in which this determination
is to be made. It appears that Section 851.8 permits a person to be
found not factually innocent based upon a showing of guilt by less
than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard required for criminal conviction. It also appears that the court may consider illegally obtained
evidence in making this determination, as the exclusion of relevant evidence would seem to be the primary reason a person who is not convicted of the crime would be found not factually innocent. Furthermore, the factually innocent determination, by express provision in Section 851.8, is to be made by the presiding judge. Therefore the net
effect of Chapter 904 may be to create a procedure whereby a person
may, by inference, be found "factually guilty" of a crime without the
protection afforded by the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, without a determination beyond a reasonable doubt, and without a trial by
a jury of peers.
Criminal Procedure; dismissals
Penal Code § 1387 (amended).

SB 487 (Song);

STATS

1975, Ch 1069

Support: State Bar of California
Opposition: California District Attorneys' Association; California
Peace Officers' Association
Chapter 1069 has amended Section 1387 of the Penal Code to provide that dismissal of a felony charge is a bar to further prosecution
for the same offense if the action has previously been dismissed. This
bar to further prosecution arises if both dismissals were pursuant to one
or more of the following Penal Code Sections: (1) Section 1381, which
requires that a person sentenced for one offense be brought to trial on
any other pending charge within 90 days; (2) Section 1381.5, which
requires that a person incarcerated in a federal prison be brought to trial
on a state offense within 90 days of a federal authority's assent to release
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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for trial; (3) Section 1382, which requires that an information be filed
within 15 days of the time a person is held to answer, and that a person
be brought to trial within 60 days of the filing of an information or indictment, or declaration of mistrial or an order for a new trial; or (4)
Section 1385, which permits a court, on its own motion or that of the
prosecuting attorney, to dismiss an action when such dismissal is in the
furtherance of justice. A court may make an exception to this bar to
prosecution only when it finds that substantial new evidence has been
discovered by the prosecution which could not, by due diligence, have
been found prior to the dismissal.
COMMENT

Prior to this amendment, Section 1387 provided a bar to further prosecution only in cases where the charge dismissed was a misdemeanor.
Thus there was no statutory restriction on the number of times felony
charges relating to the same offense could be filed. The absence of such
a restriction emasculated the defendant's statutory right to be brought
to trial within 60 days [CAL. PN. CoDE §1382], in that when a
defendant raised the right it was possible to simply dismiss the charges
and then immediately re-arrest him or her on the same charges. It appears, however, that a person harassed by multiple prosecutions for the
same offense was able to find some relief in case law. In People v. Williams [71 Cal. 2d 614, 456 P.2d 633, 79 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1969)] the
California Supreme Court, while holding that the facts before it did not
present such a case, stated, in dicta, that there are circumstances which
would make a new prosecution under the then existing Section 1387 violative of the constitutional right to a speedy trial [id. at 623, 456 P.2d
at 637, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 69]. The court did not, however, elaborate
on what those circumstances might be. In an earlier case [Barker v.
Municipal Ct., 64 Cal. 2d 806, 415 P.2d 809, 51 Cal. Rptr. 921
(1966)] it was held that it was not necessary for a person to rely on
the statutory scheme to assert the constitutional right to a speedy trial,
as the provisions of the Penal Code are merely supplementary to the
state and federal constitutions [Id. at 812, 415 P.2d at 813, 51 Cal.
Rptr. at 925 (1966)]. Presumably, then, even under former law a person could rightfully claim that a series of prosecutions and dismissals
had delayed trial to the point of violating the constitutional right to a
speedy trial and that therefore further prosecution was barred.
The amended Section 1387 now provides a felony defendant some
measure of statutory protection from prosecutorial abuse by allowing,
Selected 1975 California Legislation
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after a complaint is dismissed, only one further complaint based on the
same occurrence. It should be noted, however, that this amendment
still does not allow the felony defendant the full benefit of the various
statutory rights to a speedy trial [CAL. PEN. CODE §1381 et seq.] as
when these rights are first exercised, the felony defendant finds that
rather than being free from further criminal proceedings as provided,
he or she is subject to re-arrest and a second prosecution.
Criminal Procedure; pretrial discovery
Penal Code §1430 (new); §859 (amended).
AB 1019 (Sieroty); STATS 1975, Ch 799
Support: State Bar of California
Chapter 799 has added Penal Code Section 1430, and has amended
Penal Code Section 859, to require a prosecuting attorney to deliver or
make available to a defendant copies of all relevant police, arrest, and
crime reports within two calendar days of the first court appearance of
counsel, or of the determination that the defendant can represent himself. If the charges against the defendant are dismissed before the reports are delivered or inspected, the duty to disclose terminates unless
it is otherwise required by law. The duty to deliver or make these documents available does not extend to portions of such reports which are
privileged, provided that the defendant or counsel has been notified that
privileged information has not been disclosed [For discussion of government privileges, see Comment, Governmental Privileges: Roadblock to
Effective Discovery, 7 U.S.F. L. REv. 282 (1973)]. The chapter further provides that it is the intent of the California Legislature that no
provision of this chapter shall be construed to limit existing rights of
discovery in criminal cases [CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 799, §3, at
COMMENT
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 799, procedures for discovery in
criminal cases, with the exception of matters relating to identity of informants [CAL. EVID.CODE §§1041, 1042], were controlled exclusively
by case law [4B CALIFORNIA FORMS OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE ANNOTATED, Criminal Procedure, 105 (1972)]. In Brady v. Maryland
[373 U.S. 83 (1963)] the U.S. Supreme Court held that where evidence exists which is favorable to the accused on the issues of guilt or
punishment, and such evidence is requested by him or her, suppression
of that evidence violates due process [Id. at 87]. Earlier, the California
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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Supreme Court had declared that upon a proper showing, the defendant
in a criminal case has the right to discovery of material evidence at trial
[People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 585-86, 305 P.2d 1, 13 (1956)]
and before trial [Powell v. Super. Ct., 48 Cal. 2d 704, 707-09, 312
P.2d 698, 700 (1957)]. The cases have not, however, specified at
what point in time before trial the right to discovery arises [4B CALIFORNIA FORMS OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE ANNOTATED, CriminalProcedure, 107 (1972)]. Some courts allowed discovery at the preliminary hearing, while others did not permit discovery until after an information or indictment was returned [Id.]. By requiring that the reports
be delivered or made available to the defendant within two days of the
first appearance in court by counsel, Sections 859 and 1430 appear to
set the time for discovery, at least in relation to "police, arrest, and crime
reports."
While Chapter 799 presumably resolves the problem of the proper
time for discovery, it appears to raise other issues. For example, what
will qualify as a police, arrest, or crime report is not made clear by its
language. In People v. Torres [19 Cal. App. 3d 724, 731, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 139, 143 (1971)] it was held that notes made during a police
interrogation are discoverable. Another case held that experts' reports
concerning the examination of real evidence were also discoverable
[People v. Johnson, 38 Cal. App. 3d 228, 235, 113 Cal. Rptr. 303,
308 (1974) (hereinafter referred to as Johnson)]. Whether such reports as these fall within the provisions of this chapter is not apparent
upon the face of the bill.
Prior case law also provided that the prosecuting attorney was required to disclose evidence favorable to the accused, even when there
was no request for such from the defendant, if such evidence was "substantial" and "material" [In re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d 525, 532, 487 P.2d
1234, 1239, 96 Cal. Rptr. 594, 599 (1971) (hereinafter referred to
as Ferguson)]. Apparently these two elements are no longer required
if the evidence falls within the provisions of this chapter. However the
meaning of the word "relevant" as used in the new and amended sections may be the source of future controversy. Section 210 of the California Evidence Code defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence, including that relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action." In Johnson, the
Evidence Code definition of relevance was utilized to determine what
evidence was discoverable. The Ferguson Court, however, without speSelected 1975 California Legislation
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cifically using the word "relevant," determined that the defendant did
not receive a fair trial because the prosecution failed to disclose information which might have led the defendant to other evidence favorable to
his case. Whether police, arrest; and crime reports which may lead a
defendant to other evidence are "relevant" within the meaning of Chapter 799 is not readily apparent.
Finally, Sections 859 and 1430 provide neither a remedy for the defendant nor a sanction against the prosecuting attorney should there be
a failure to disclose relevant reports. It appears probable that the prosecutor alone will review the specified reports to determine if they are relevant and thus whether they fall within the provisions of this chapter.
It also seems apparent that because the prosecution or the police have
control over the reports covered by these sections, it will be difficult for
a defendant to ferret out violations of its provisions. Because there will
be no one looking over the prosecutor's shoulder, it would seem that
only a relatively severe penalty for violation will compel any greater diligence in compliance with the chapter than that compelled by the prosecutor's own conscience. The court-created sanctions set forth in Ferguson and Johnson do not seem adequate, in that in each of those cases
the court granted the defendant a new trial only upon a showing that
the defendant's use of undisclosed evidence might have led to an acquittal. The inherent difficulty in showing this degree of prejudice, considered together with the small probability that a violation of Sections 859
and 1430 will ever be discovered, indicates that the remedy established
by case law provides little incentive for strict compliance.
See Generally:

1)

Suppression: The Prosecution's Failure to Disclose Evidence Favorable to the Defense, 7 U.S.F. L. REV. 348 (1973).

Criminal Procedure; opening statements
Penal Code §1093 (amended).
AB 522 (Meade); STATS 1975, Ch 195
Support: State Bar of California; California Trial Lawyers' Association
Section 1093 of the Penal Code has been amended to provide a defendant the option of presenting his or her opening statement either
prior or subsequent to the presentation of evidence by the people. This
option may be exercised even though the people choose not to make an
opening statement.
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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Often when there exists a particularly strong defense, or when the
people have presented a spirited opening, the defendant will find it tactically desirable to present his or her opening statement immediately following that of the people [I. GOLDSTEIN & F. LANE, GOLDSTEIN TRIAL
TECHNIQUE § 10.06 (2d ed. 1969)]. The language of the former Section 1093 did not permit the defendant this option, as it specified that
the defendant's opening statement would follow the presentation of the
people's evidence. However Section 1094 of the Penal Code permitted
the court "for good reasons" to depart from the order of trial specified
in Section 1093. In addition, in People v. Struve [190 Cal. App. 2d
358, 360, 12 Cal. Rptr. 47, 48 (1961)] the court, interpreting Section
1094, held that altering the prescribed order of trial to allow the defendant to present his or her opening statement before the presentation of
the people's evidence was a matter entirely within the discretion of the
court. Thus it seems that in practice the defendant was normally permitted to choose at what point in the trial his or her opening statement
would be presented. As amended, Section 1093 codifies this practice
by specifically granting this option to the defendant. It should be noted,
however, that because Section 1094 remains unchanged, this and all
other matters relating to the order of trial appear to remain within the
discretion of the court.
Criminal Procedure; false evidence
Penal Code §§800, 1473 (amended).
AB 48 (Cullen); STATS 1975, Ch 1047
Opposition: California District Attorneys' Association; California
Peace Officers' Association
Chapter 1047 has amended Penal Code Section 1473 to specifically
permit the granting of a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the
person seeking the writ, was imprisoned on the basis of false
evidence. To obtain the writ, the false evidence must have been introduced at a hearing or trial relating to that person's incarceration, and
the evidence must have been material and probative on the issue of guilt
or punishment. The writ may be obtained even though the person prosecuting it entered a plea of guilty, if the person at the time of the plea
believed the evidence to be factual, and this belief was a material factor
in the entering of the guilty plea. It is further provided that whether
the prosecution knew or should have known the evidence was false is
immaterial to the granting of a writ under this section.
Selected 1975 California Legislation
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Section 800 of the Penal Code has been amended to provide that the
statute of limitations for violations of Penal Code Section 132 (offering
false evidence) and Section 134 (preparing false evidence) shall run for
three years following the discovery of the crime. Prior to this change
the section required that an indictment, information, or certification be
filed within three years of the commission of the offense.
COMMENT
,Prior to this amendment the writ of habeas corpus was the proper
remedy for a person incarcerated on the basis of false evidence [People
v. Adamson, 34 Cal. 2d 320, 327, 210 P.2d 13, 16 (1949)]. To obtain this writ, however, a petitioner was required to demonstrate by a
preponderance of evidence that false evidence was introduced against
him, and that representatives of the state knew the evidence was false
at the time it was introduced [In re Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 560, 387
P.2d 6, 8, 35 Cal. Rptr. 293, 296 (1963)]. Thus it appears that prior
to this chapter a person who was imprisoned on the basis of false evidence had no recourse if the prosecutor entered the evidence without
knowledge of its falsity. The amended section creates a remedy for a
person in this- position by specifically providing that the prosecutor's
knowledge or lack thereof is immaterial to the granting of a writ. This
change brings California law in accord with current federal practice
[See Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956)].
Chapter 1047 does not specify the degree of proof required to establish that false evidence was introduced or that the introduction of false
evidence affected the result of the trial. A prior California Supreme
Court case, In re Imbler [60 Cal. 2d 554, 387 P.2d 6, 35 Cal. Rptr.
293 (1963)], established the requirement that a person seeking a writ
of habeas corpus show, by a preponderance of evidence, that the use
of false testimony may have affected the outcome of the trial [Id. at
560, 387 P.2d at 8, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 296]. A provision in an earlier
version of Assembly Bill 48 provided that a writ could not be denied
unless it was shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the outcome was
not affected [A.B. 48, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, May 1,
1975]. This provision was deleted by Senate amendment [A.B. 48,
1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, June 13, 1975]. Thus it appears that the legislature intended to retain the preponderance of evidence standard set forth in Imbler. In a 1975 case, however, the prosecution had withheld evidence which tended to impeach one of its witnesses [People v. Ruthford, 14 Cal. 3d 399, 534 P.2d 1341, 121 Cal.
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7

Criminal Procedure

Rptr. 261 (1975)]. In ordering a new trial, the court held that suppression of the evidence violated due process, and therefore it was encumbent upon the prosecution to show beyond a reasonable doubt that
the petitioner was not prejudiced [ld. at 408, 534 P.2d at 1348, 121
Cal. Rptr. at 268]. If suppression of evidence tending to show that
testimony is false is a violation of due process, it would seem that the
actual introduction of false testimony would be an even greater violation,
and therefore would similarly require that the prosecution prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not harmed.
See Generally:

1)

Comment: Relief from Convictions Based upon Perjured Testimony-A Proposal
for a Reasonable Standard, 11 SANTA CLARA LAwYER 316 (1971).

Criminal Procedure; release of
defendant upon writ of habeas corpus
Penal Code §1506 (amended).
AB 1283 (Sieroty); STATS 1975, Ch 1080
Opposition: Attorney General; California District Attorneys' Association; California Peace Officers' Association
Section 1506 of the Penal Code guarantees the right of the people
to appeal a final order discharging a defendant upon a writ of habeas
corpus. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1080, Section 1506 did not
permit a defendant to be released pursuant to a grant of habeas corpus
when the people appealed the ruling, unless such release was upon bail.
As amended, Section 1506 requiresa court, upon the granting of a writ
of habeas corpus, to admit the defendant to bail, to release the defendant
on his or her own recognizance, or to release him or her on any other
conditions the court deems just and reasonable. Such a release shall
be subject to the same limitations, terms, or conditions which may be
imposed on a defendant awaiting trial. Therefore, if a judge does not
release a defendant who has obtained a writ on his or her own recognizance or in some other manner, he or she must release such a defendant upon bail. There is no provision, however, limiting the amount at
which bail may be set, although the constitutional guarantee against excessive bail could come into play [CAL. CONST. art. 1, §6]. Thus,
while this amendment appears to be designed to facilitate the release of
a defendant who has obtained a writ during the pendancy of an appeal
by the people, it would appear that a judge may make it difficult for
a defendant to obtain his or her discharge by imposing a large bail requirement.
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Criminal Procedure; prisoner civil rights
Penal Code Article 1 (commencing with §2600) (repealed); Article
1 (commencing with §2600) (new); Chapter 3 (commencing with
§2600) (amended).
AB 1506 (Sieroty); STATs 1975, Ch 1175
Section 2600 of the Penal Code now provides that a person sentenced
to imprisonment in a state prison can be deprived of rights during confinement only if the deprivation is necessary in order to provide for the
reasonable security of the institution in which such person is confined
and for the reasonable protection of the public. Previously, a sentence
of imprisonment in a state prison for any term suspended all the civil
rights of the confined person, except for the following: (1) rights restored by a decision of the Adult Authority or the judge who imposed
the sentence; (2) specified rights which could not be abridged, including the right to inherit real or personal property; (3) the right to correspond with members of the State Bar or holders of public office (subject
to inspection for contraband by prison authorities); (4) the right to
ownership of all written material produced by them during the period
of their imprisonment; and (5) the right to purchase, receive, and read
any and all newspapers, periodicals, and books accepted for distribution
by the United States Post Office, subject to prison authority inspection
of material and exclusion of matter which was determined by authorities
to be obscene or to tend to incite violence [CAL. STATS. 1941, c. 106,
§15, at 1091]. Although the provisions of the Penal Code did not
place any other restrictions on the deprivation of civil rights, the California Supreme Court has required a showing that valid and compelling
institutional considerations be present before rights can be taken away
[In re van Geldem, 5 Cal. 3d 832, 489 P.2d 578, 97 Cal. Rptr. 693
(1971)].
Section 2601 of the Penal Code as added by Chapter 1175, retains
the specified rights of prisoners enumerated above and expands some
of those provisions to give prisoners the right to inherit, own, sell, or
convey real or personal property, including all written and artistic material produced or created by persons during the period of their imprisonment. However, the Department of Corrections is authorized to restrict or prohibit sales or conveyances made for business purposes. Furthermore, Chapter 1175 has amended Section 2601 to add "legal material" to the list of types of printed material which prisoners may purchase, receive, and read, while excepting materials describing the making of any weapon, explosive, poison, or destructive device from this list.
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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Additionally, the provisions which allow prison authorities to censor materials are deleted, except that officials may open and inspect packages
received by inmates and establish reasonable restrictions as to the number of materials which an inmate may have at one time. This provision
apparently complies with the holding of the United States Supreme
Court in Procunier v. Martinez [416 U.S. 396 (1974)] in which the
Court stated that censorship of prisoner mail is justified only if such regulation furthers an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression and if the limitation on first
amendment freedoms is no greater than is necessary or essential to the
protection of the particular governmental interest involved [Id. at 413].
Section 2601 also gives prisoners the right to have personal visits (restricted only as necessary for the reasonable security of the institution),
to initiate civil actions, to marry, to create a power of appointment, and
to make a will.
See Generally:
1) Bergesen, California Prisoners: Rights Without Remedies, 25 STAN. L. REv. 1

2)
3)

(1972).
Comment, Restoration of Rights to Felons in California, 2 PAc. L.J. 718 (1971).
6 PAC. L.J., REvIEw OF SELECTED 1974 CALIFORNIA LEGxSLATION 292-93 (1975).

Criminal Procedure; prisoners--discipline
Penal Code §2657 (new).
SB 1188 (Nejedly); STATs 1975, Ch 726
Support: California Department of Corrections
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 726, no provision of law prevented
a prisoner confined to a state prison from being institutionally disciplined by prison authorities for a charged criminal offense for which he
or she had been acquitted by a court of law. Chapter 726 has added
Section 2657 to the 'Penal Code to prohibit prison authorities from disciplining any prisoner when the sole reason for such discipline is the
alleged criminal act or omission of the prisoner for which he or she has
been acquitted. Further, Section 2657 also requires that the fact of the
prisoner's acquittal be clearly noted in any file retained by the Department of Corrections that refers to such act or omission. This legislation
was apparently prompted by the Department of Correction's policy of
permitting the punishment of prisoners acquitted of a crime when it is
felt by the authorities that the prisoner did in fact commit the offense.
However, subsequent to the introduction of Senate Bill 1188 in the legislature, the Department of Corrections re-evaluated this practice and revised their procedure to require that the verdict of the court be accepted
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as the final determination of guilt or innocence [Letter from Walter L.
Barkdull, Assistant Director, Department of Corrections, to Senator
John A. Nejedly, July 15, 1975 (on file at the Pacific Law Journal)].
Therefore, the enactment of Chapter 726 codifies Department policy.
See Generally:
1) WITIN, CALIFoRNIA CRIMINAL fRoCEDURE, Trial §314 (1963)

person imprisoned).

(dismissal where

Criminal Procedure; probation
Health and Safety Code §§11350, 11351, 11352, 13370 (amended);
Penal Code §§1203.06, 1203.07 (new), §§1203, 1203.03
(amended); Welfare and Institutions Code §§3052, 3200
(amended).
SB 268 (Robbins); STATS 1975, Ch 1087

Support: California District Attorneys' Association; California Peace
Officers' Association
SB 278 (Deukmejian); STATS 1975, Ch 1004

Support: California District Attorneys' Association; California Peace
Officers' Association
Opposition: California Probation, Parole, and Correctional Association; California Public Defenders' Association
Chapters 1004 and 1087 have been enacted to prohibit the granting
of probation to, or suspension of sentence for, persons convicted of certain crimes. Chapter 1087 has added Section 1203.07 to the Penal Code
to prohibit the granting of probation to any person: (1) convicted pursuant to Health and Safety Code Section 11351 for possession for sale
of one-half ounce or more of a narcotic listed in that section; (2) convicted pursuant to Health and Safety Code Section 11352 for importation, sale, or offering for sale one-half ounce of a narcotic listed in that
section; or (3) convicted pursuant to Section 11351 or 11352 for importation, sale, offering for sale, or possession of any amount of a narcotic listed in those sections when such person has a previous conviction
under either section.
While prohibiting the granting of probation in certain narcotic cases,
Chapter 1087 removes former restrictions on the granting of parole.
Health and Safety Code Section 11350 has been amended to delete a
former requirement that a person could not be released or paroled until
completion of a minimum of two years confinement for a first conviction, or five years confinement for a subsequent conviction relating to
possession of narcotics. Similar provisions of Health and Safety Code
Sections 11351 (possession for sale) and 11352 (importation, sale, or
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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offering for sale) which established minimum periods of confinement
have also been deleted. Furthermore, Chapter 1087 amends Penal
Code Section 1203.03 to provide that time spent as an inpatient or outpatient in a California Rehabilitation Center shall be credited to a term
of imprisonment imposed in the same case.
Section 1203.06, as added by Chapter 1004, prohibits the granting
of probation to, or suspension of sentence for, any person who used a
firearm in the commission of any of the following crimes: (1) murder; (2) assault with intent to commit murder in violation of Penal
Code Section 217; (3) kidnapping in violation of Penal Code Section
207; (4) robbery in violation of Penal Code Section 211; (5) kidnapping for ransom in violation of Penal Code Section 209; (6) first
degree burglary as defined in Penal Code Section 460; (7) rape by
force or violence in violation of Subdivision (2) of Penal Code Section 261; (8) rape by threat of bodily harm in violation of Subdivision (3) of Penal Code Section 261; (9) assault with intent to commit rape, sodomy, or robbery in violation of Penal Code Section 220;
or (10) escape from confinement in violation of Penal Code Sections
4530 and 4532. In addition, Section 1203.06 provides that a person who was formerly convicted of one of these ten crimes, and who
is subsequently convicted of any felony in which he or she used a firearm, may not be granted probation. "Use" of a firearm for the purposes of this section is defined as displaying it in a menacing manner,
intentionally firing it, or intentionally striking a person with it.
Both Chapters 1087 and 1004 require that the circumstances leading to the denial of probation or suspension of sentence be specifically
charged in the information or indictment. The charge must then be
found true by one of the following: (1) admission in open court; (2)
the jury trying the issue of guilt; (3) trial by the court sitting without
a jury; or (4) the court where guilt is established by a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere. Since a plea of nolo contendere does not admit the
truth of the charges, it appears that this section may require litigation of
the issue of the use of a firearm when a nolo plea is entered. Neither
chapter prohibits the adjournment of proceedings in order to procure
treatment for narcotic addiction pursuant to Division 3 (commencing
with §3000) of the Welfare and Institutions Code, or to provide treatment for mentally disordered defendants pursuant to Division 6 (commencing with §6000) of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Formerly, Penal Code Section 1203 required the prosecuting attorney
to concur before probation could be granted in certain cases. This proSelected 1975 California Legislation
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vision was held to violate the separation of powers doctrine set forth in
the California Constitution [CAL. CONST. art 3, §1, art. 4, §1; People
v. Clay, 18 Cal. App. 3d 964, 970, 96 Cal. Rptr. 213, 217 (1971);
People v. McManis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 608, 619, 102 Cal. Rptr. 889, 896
(1972)]. Consequently Section 1203 has been amended to permit the
granting of probation without the concurrence of the prosecutor.
Criminal Procedure; drug diversion program
Penal Code §1000.3 (repealed); §§1000.3, 1000.5 (new); §§1000,
1000.1, 1000.2, 1000.4 (amended).
AB 1274 (Sieroty); STATS 1975, Ch 1267
Opposition: Attorney General; California District Attorneys' Association; California Peace Officers' Association
'Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1267, the Campbell-Moretti-Deukmejian Drug Abuse Treatment Act [CAL. PEN. CODE §1000 et seq.],
which provides a mechanism to direct narcotic and drug law violators
from the criminal justice system into a noncriminal rehabilitation program [6 PAc. L.J., REviEw OF SELEcTED 1974 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION 288 (1975)], was scheduled to terminate January 1, 1977 [CAL.
STATS. 1974, c. 1014, §1, at
]. Chapter 1267 has amended Section
1000.4 to extend the termination date until January 1, 1979. Chapter
1267 has also made minor amendments in the diversion procedure.
Section 1000 of the Penal Code has also been amended by Chapter
1267 to make the diversion program no longer applicable to cases involving possession of methylamene or phenylacetone with the intent to
manufacture methyamphetamine. However, the program has been extended to now encompass (1) violations of Health and Safety Code Sections 11550 (unlawful use or being under the influence of a controlled
substance) and 11358 (unauthorized cultivation, harvesting, or processing of marijuana for personal use), (2) violations of Penal Code Sections 381 (unlawfully under the influence of certain poisons) and 647
(inability to care for oneself or others in a public place due to unlawfully
being under the influence of a controlled substance), and (3) violations
of Business and Professions Code Section 4230 (possession of certain
drugs without a prescription). Furthermore, Chapter 1267 has deleted
the former requirement of Section 1000 that a defendant not have a probation or parole violation to be eligible for the program. However, the
diversion program is not available to a defendant whose parole or probation has been revoked without being completed, nor is it available to
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one who has been diverted or convicted of a felony within the previous
five years.
In People v. Superior Court [11 Cal. 3d 59, 520 P.2d 405, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 21 (1974)], the California Supreme Court decided that the separation of powers doctrine prohibited a district attorney from preventing
the diversion of a qualified defendant. Thus, Section 1000.2 has been
amended by Chapter 1267 to no longer require the approval of the district attorney prior to diversion. However, if a district attorney determines a defendant to be eligible, he or she must now advise both the
defendant and his or her attorney to -this effect (§1000.1). Among
other things, this notice should include a full description of the procedures of the diversion investigation (§1000.1). Section 1000.1 also
prohibits the use of any statement by the defendant to a probation officer
or drug worker subsequent to diversion in any action or proceeding; and
if the diversion is denied or revoked, no statement made during the investigation may be used in any sentencing proceeding.
Sections 1000.3 and 1000.5 have also been added to the Penal Code
by Chapter 1267. Section 1000.3 provides for both a court hearing to
be held if a probation department feels the defendant has violated the
conditions of the program, and for a dismissal of charges when the defendant has satisfactorily completed the program. Section 1000.5 provides that a satisfactory completion of the program will also permit a
defendant to state that he or she has never been arrested or diverted from
the offense for which he or she was charged.
See Generally:
1) Comment, Diversion and the JudicialFunction, 5 PAC. LJ. 764 (1974).
I.GISLATUON 405 (1973)
2) 4 PAc. LJ., REviEw OF SELECTED 1972 CALIFOm
(statewide program for the prevention of narcotic and drug abuse).

Criminal Procedure; driving while intoxicated
Vehicle Code §§13201.5, 13352.5 (new); §13201 (amended).
SB 330 (Gregorio); STATS 1975, Ch 1133
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1133, a court was permitted to suspend a driver license upon a person's first conviction for driving under
the influence of intoxicants. Upon a second conviction within a five
year period, however, the court was required to suspend a person's driving privileges. Likewise, a third conviction within a seven year period
resulted in revocation of those privileges [CAL. VEHICLE CODE §13352].
These penalties were imposed in addition to the fines or imprisonment
mandated by Vehicle Code Section 23102 (driving under the influence
Selected 1975 California Legislation
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of alcohol or drugs). The only way in which a court could encourage
a convicted person to seek treatment was through Section 23102(c),
which allows the court, upon a person's first conviction only, to reduce
the minimum fine from $250.00 to $150.00 if such person attends a
driver education or alcohol abuse program.
Chapter 1133 provides an alternative to the suspension or revocation
of a drivers' license when a person is convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants. Section 13201.5 has been added to the Vehicle
Code to permit a court to refrain from suspending driving privileges if
the person convicted agrees to participate, for at least one year, in a program for the treatment of alcohol abuse, provided that the program
meets the standards established by the Office of Alcohol Program Management. These standards shall include: (1) close and regular supervision of the person, including biweekly face to face meetings; (2) fee
standards and provisions for indigents established by the Office of Alcohol Program Management; and (3) a variety of treatment services for
problem drinkers and alcoholics. Section 13201.5 further requires periodic reports on the progress of a person attending such a program,
and an immediate report should such person fail to comply with the
rules of the program. If the court finds the person has failed to comply
with the rules of the program, it shall order the person's driving privileges suspended for the period prescribed by law. Section 13352.5 has
also been added to the Vehicle Code to prohibit the Department of Motor Vehicles from suspending or revoking the driver license of a person
attending a treatment program under the provisions set forth above.
The programs set forth in Chapter 1133 are to be established on a
"demonstration basis" during the period of January 1, 1976 to December 31, 1977. During this period, these programs are to be implemented in the four or fewer counties deemed most appropriate by the
Office of Alcohol Program Management. The provisions of the chapter
will become applicable to all counties commencing on January 1, 1978.
Furthermore, the provisions of this chapter do not preclude voluntary
participation in driver training in lieu of suspension of a driver license,
or commitment to any other program for drinking drivers established
by law.
Criminal Procedure; resentencing of juveniles
Welfare and Institutions Code §1737 (amended).
SB 260 (Zenovich); STATS 1975, Ch 1103
396
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Since 1964 Penal Code Section 1168 (relating to sentencing of adult
felons) has permitted a court to recall a sentence when such action is
deemed warranted by a psychiatric diagnostic study of the defendant
conducted pursuant to Penal Code Section 5079 [CAL. STATS. 1963,
c. 1856, §12, at 38331. This authority to resentence has proved desirable where a psychiatric study reveals that the defendant would receive
greater rehabilitative benefit from probation than from incarceration
[See People v. Barnes, 239 Cal. App. 2d 705, 707, 49 Cal. Rptr. 77,
78 (1966)], and in situations where a diagnostic study demonstrates
that a sentence should not have been imposed [See, Holder v. Super.
Ct., 1 Cal. 3d 779, 781, 463 P.2d 705, 706, 83 Cal. Rptr. 353, 354
(1970)]. The resentencing provision has been considered an alternative to Penal Code Section 1203.03, which sets forth a procedure for
obtaining a diagnostic study prior to sentencing [Id. at 782 n.3, 463
P.2d at 707 n.3, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 355 n.3].
Even though commitment of a juvenile to the Youth Authority has
been held to be a pronouncement of sentence [People v. Navarro, 7
Cal. 3d 248, 271, 497 P.2d 481, 497, 102 Cal. Rptr. 137, 153 (1972)1,
under former statutory law there was no provision authorizing a court
to reconsider such a commitment. To remedy this situation, Chapter
1103 has amended Welfare and Institutions Code Section 1737 to authorize a court to reconsider the commitment of a juvenile if it is deemed
warranted by a diagnostic study approved by the Director of Youth Authority. Reconsideration may be accomplished under this section on the
court's own motion within 120 days of initial commitment, and any time
thereafter upon the recommendation of the Director. Any time served
prior to resentencing must be credited towards the term subsequently
imposed.
Criminal Procedure; reports of child abuse
Penal Code §11161.6 (new); §11161.5 (amended).
AB 1063 (Robinson); STATS 1975, Ch 226
Support: California District Attorneys' Association; California Peace
Officers' Association
Section 11161.5 of the Penal Code requires specified individuals to
report instances of suspected child abuse or molestation to the local police and juvenile probation department or, in the alternative, to the
county welfare department or county health department. Individuals
required to make such reports include physicians, teachers, dentists, licensed day-care workers, and social workers. Failure to report is a misSelected 1975 California Legislation
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demeanor punishable by a fine of $500, a sentence of six months in jail,
or both (§11162). To facilitate discovery of child abuse by eliminating
the reporter's fear of being sued by parents for malicious prosecution,
libel, or slander, persons required to report enjoy immunity from any
civil or criminal liability for making a report (§11161.5). Chapter 226
has amended Section 11161.5 to remove immunity from those who, with
malice, make a false report. The requirement that the report be both
false and malicious is probably indicative of a legislative intent to protect
reports made with malice but with a reasonable belief of suspected child
abuse, since discovering child abuse is in the public interest regardless
of the reporter's motive [Comment, The California Legislative Approach to the Problem of Wilful Child Abuse, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1805,
1819 (1966)].
Chapter 226 has also added Section 11161.6 to the Penal Code to
provide that probation officers may report suspected child abuse to the
government authorities listed in Section 11161.5. Furthermore, probation officers have been accorded the same immunity as those required
to report.
COMMENT
The argument against requiring probation officers or social workers
to report child abuse is that fear of prosecution may create such hostility
in parents that social workers or probation officers working with the
family may not be able to effect positive changes. To the extent that this
argument is valid, it would seem that social workers should be removed
from the category of those required to report child abuse, and allowed
to, in a manner similar to probation officers, use their discretion in determining whether to file such reports [Comment, The Battered Child:
Logic in Search of Law, 8 SAN Drc,o L. REv. 364, 382-83 (1971)].
See Generally:
1) Kohlman, Malpractice Liability for Failing to Report Child Abuse, 49 CAL. S.BJ.
118 (1974) (noting physicians are not being prosecuted for failure to report child
abuse and suggesting alternative civil remedies).

Criminal Procedure; nolo contendere
Penal Code §1016 (amended).
AD 1276 (Sieroty); STATs 1975, Ch 687
Support: State Bar of California
Opposition: California District Attorneys' Association
Prior to amendment by Chapter 687, Section 1016 of the Penal Code
required a prosecuting attorney's consent before a defendant was perPacific Law Journal Vol. 7
398
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mitted to plead nolo contendere to a criminal charge. Chapter 687 has
amended Section 1016 to delete this requirement, leaving the acceptance
of a nolo plea to the sole discretion of the court. The chapter further
amends section 1016 to require that the court ascertain whether the defendant completely understands the plea, understands that the plea will
be considered the same as a guilty plea, and understands that he or she
will be found guilty based on the plea.
COMMENT
There are many reasons why a defendant may wish to enter a plea
of nolo contendere rather than a plea of guilty. The language of Section
1016 provides one of the reasons, in that it states "[tihe legal effect
of such a plea shall be the same as that of a plea of guilty, but the plea
may not be used against the defendant as an admission in any civil suit
based upon or growing out of the act upon which the criminal prosecution is based." Other reasons why a defendant may prefer a nolo plea
include a desire to avoid the publicity of a trial while not wanting to
admit guilt, an inability or unwillingness to present evidence establishing
innocence, and an honest uncertainty as to guilt or innocence where
complex laws are involved [Note, Use Of The Nolo Contendere Plea
In Subsequent Contexts, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 737 (1971)].
There appears to have been no articulated rationale for the former
requirement that the prosecuting attorney consent to the entering of a
nolo plea. The rationale was even less apparent when one considered
that no such requirement existed in relation to any of the other five defendants' pleas authorized by Penal Code Section 1016. Furthermore,
few prosecutors' offices have stated a coherent policy as to when consent
to a nolo plea should be given [Id. at 751]. Furthermore, it is contended that a more liberal use of the nolo contendere plea will save trial
time, on the assumption that some defendants would prefer a trial on
the merits to a plea of guilty, but would forego a trial if permitted to
plead nolo contendere [STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 1974 CONFERENCE
RESOLUTION 1-33]. It is also argued that there is no valid reason to
deny a defendant the option of pleading nolo contendere, as in a criminal proceeding it has the same effect as a plea of guilty [Id.].
Criminal Procedure; classification of offenses
Penal Code §17 (amended).
SB 488 (Song); STATS 1975, Ch 664
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Opposition:

California District Attorneys' Association; California

Peace Officers' Association
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 664, Section 17 of the Penal Code
provided, inter alia, that where an offense charged could be classified
as either a felony or a misdemeanor, the consent of the prosecutor and
defendant was required before a .magistrate was permitted to determine
that the offense was a misdemeanor. In 1971 the California Supreme
Court determined that this provision was in violation of the California
Constitution [Esteybar v. Municipal Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 119, 485 P.2d 1140,
95 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1971)]. In that case the defendant was charged
with possession of one marijuana cigarette, an offense which at that time
could be classified as either a felony or a misdemeanor under former
Health and Safety Code Section 11530. The policy of the district attorney prosecuting the case was to consent to a misdemeanor charge only
if a defendant plead guilty. In arguing to uphold Section 17, the people
contended that the information and indictment process is regulated by
the legislature, and that a magistrate's functions at a preliminary hearing
were therefore properly regulated by statute [Id. at 126, 485 P.2d at
1144, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 528]. The court, however, noted that a prosecutor exercises executive powers while a magistrate exercises judicial
powers [Id. at 127, 485 P.2d at 1145, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 529]. Therefore, it was held that a prosecutor's interference with a magistrate's discretion in determining the classification of a particular offense violated
Article 3, Section 1 (separation of powers, currently Article 3, Section
3) of the California Constitution [id.]. Chapter 664 has deleted the
provision of Penal Code Section 17 which required the prosecutor's and
defendant's consent for classification of an offense as a misdemeanor,
causing the classification to be a matter entirely within the discretion
of the magistrate, and thus Section 17 has been brought into conformity
with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the California Constitution.
Criminal Procedure; telephone calls after arrest
Penal Code §851.5 (repealed); §851.5 (new).
AB 1199 (Torres); STATS 1975, Ch 1200
Support: State Bar of California
Chapter 1200 has added a new Section 851.5 to the Penal Code to
provide that a person who is arrested has a right to complete two telephone calls immediately upon being booked which, except where physically impossible, must occur no later than three hours after arrest.
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The opportunity to make these calls will be afforded at no expense to
the arrested person if the calls are within the local telephone area. This
section now specifies that the right includes calls to two of the following:
(1) an attorney, or if the arrested person has no funds, to a public defender or other attorney assigned to represent indigents; (2) a bail
bondsman; and (3) a relative or other person. It is further provided
that a sign setting forth this right must be posted in a conspicuous place
at all police stations. The opportunity to make these calls must be given
immediately upon request, or as soon as practicable. The arrested person may not be interrupted in the exercise of this right for the purpose
of interrogation, nor may there be any monitoring of, eavesdropping
upon, or recording of any telephone call to an attorney. Furthermore,
it is provided that it is a misdemeanor for any public officer or employee
to wilfully deprive an arrested person of the rights afforded by this
chapter.
Prior to the enactment of this chapter, former Penal Code Section
851.5 provided that an arrested person had the right, immediately after
booking and not later than three hours after arrest, to complete two telephone calls at his or her own expense. That section specified that one
call could be made to an attorney, employer, or relative, and the other
to a bail bondsman. It also provided that the calls were to be made
in the presence of a public officer or employee. The California Supreme Court determined that the language of former Section 851.5 stating that the right arose immediately after booking was not intended to
be limiting, but that the right arose at booking and extended indefinitely
[In re Newbern, 55 Cal. 2d 500, 506, 360 P.2d 43, 46, 11 Cal. Rptr.
547, 550 (1961)].
COMMENT
The apparent purpose of Chapter 1200, which originated from a State
Bar of California resolution, is to bring about the early entry of counsel
in criminal proceedings [See STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 1974 CONFERENCE RESOLUTION 1-22]. Strict interpretation of former Section
851.5 would seem to indicate that the right to telephone an attorney terminated if the arrested person utilized one call to contact a relative or
employer, as the language specified that the remaining call was to be
completed to a bail bondsman. The new Section 851.5, however, states
that the calls may be made to two of three possible persons, one of which
is an attorney. Thus under the new section, a call to a relative or other
person, or a call to a bail bondsman, will not preclude a second call
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to an attorney. This language appears more likely to encourage early
contact between an arrested person and counsel.
While Chapter 1200 eliminates the former requirement that telephone
calls be made in the presence of a public officer or employee, it does
not entirely foreclose the possibility that an arrested person's call will
be overheard. The chapter proscribes the monitoring of, eavesdropping
upon or recording of any telephone call to an attorney. Federal law
prohibits the interception of any telephone call by use of a device [18
U.S.C. §§2510, 2511 (1970)]. Neither of these statutes, however,
prohibit eavesdropping on an arrested person, using only the unassisted
ear, when he or she is exercising the right given by this chapter to telephone a person other than an attorney.
As introduced, Assembly Bill 1199 provided that the person arrested
had to be advised by the arresting officer of the right to make the specified calls. A Senate amendment deleted this requirement and substituted the requirement of posting signs which explain the right [A.B.
1199, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, August 13, 1975]. This
amendment would seem to diminish the practical effect of Chapter 1200
as in the excitement of an arrest situation even the most conspicuous
sign is apt to be overlooked. The right to make telephone calls is of
little value to the person who has not observed the sign and is therefore
ignorant of the right.
Criminal Procedure; appeals
Penal Code §1238.5 (new).
SB 1211 (Rains); STATS 1975, Ch 1195
Support: State Bar of California
Penal Code Section 1237 permits a defendant to appeal from a judgment and from any order affecting the substantial rights of the party
made after judgment. Chapter 1195 has added Section 1238.5 to the
Penal Code to permit a defendant, upon an appeal by the prosecution,
to file an appeal after the expiration of the time normally available to
seek review. The section provides that the time limit for appeal is reinstated when the prosecution files notice of an appeal after the expiration
of the time allowed for the defendant to appeal. This provision relates
only to review of otherwise reviewable orders and rulings made during
the time normally available to the defendant to seek review. The new
section also directs the Judicial Council to establish rules for consolidation of the people's and the defendant's appeals.
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Formerly, Penal Code Section 1252 required an appellate court, upon
an appeal by the defendant, to consider and pass upon those trial court
rulings adverse to the people as requested by the Attorney General. In
People v. Burke [47 Cal. 2d 45, 301 P.2d 241 (1956)], the California Supreme Court held that the requirement that appellate courts pass
upon the rulings adverse to the state pursuant to Section 1252 was for
the purpose of deciding issues that may be considered again on retrial
[id. at 54, 301 P.2d at 246-47]. In addition, the court stated that unless the verdict was overturned, there was no need for the appellate court
to pass upon such rulings [Id.]. It would appear that this rationale
will apply to defendants' appeals under new Section 1238.5, so that
upon consolidation of appeals, the defendant's contentions will be considered only if the people are successful in their appeal.
Criminal Procedure; city attorneys
as defense counsel
Government Code §41805 (new).
AB 2245 (Chimbole); STATS 1975, Ch 556
Section 41805 has been added to the Government Code by Chapter
556 to permit city attorneys, not exercising prosecutorial responsibilities
for the cities which employ them, to defend, assist in the defense, or
act as counsel for any person accused of a crime. However, the city
must expressly relieve such an attorney of all prosecutorial duties. Furthermore, the defendant must expressly waive any rights created as a result of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the city attorney's position with the city, and the crime that the defendant is charged
with must not concern a violation of any ordinance of the city or cities
by which the attorney is employed. The section expressly states that
its provisions do not preclude a city from limiting or prohibiting private
practice of attorneys in its employ.
COMMENT
In People v. Rhodes [12 Cal. 3d 180, 524 P.2d 363, 115 Cal. Rptr.
235 (1974)] the California Supreme Court declared that a city attorney with prosecutorial responsibilites could not defend or assist in the
defense of a person accused of a crime [Id. at 187, 524 P.2d at 367,
115 Cal. Rptr. at 239]. However, if a city attorney has been relieved
of his or her prosecutorial duties, and the defendant knowingly waived
any potential conflict of interest, courts have allowed a city attorney to
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act as defense counsel [Montgomery v. Super. Ct., 46 Cal. App. 3d 657,
673, 121 Cal. Rptr. 44, 55 (1975)]. Therefore, it appears that Chapter 556 merely codifies the restrictions on city attorneys' activities which
were already established by the courts.
See Generally:

1)

CAL. Gov'T CODE §§37103, 53060 (authorization for cities to employ personnel
for "special services," including prosecutorial duties).

Criminal Procedure; evidence in a criminal trial
Penal Code §1418.6 (new).
AB 1056 (Hayden); STATS 1975, Ch 156
Support: California District Attorneys' Association; California Peace
Officers' Association
Sections 1418 and 1418.5 of the Penal Code provide for the return
to the owner of all exhibits after final disposition of a criminal case. The
final disposition is when the subject and res jurisdiction have ceased in
both the trial and appellate courts [45 OPs. ATT'Y GEN. 119 (1965)].
Therefore, for example, if a theft case is appealed, the victim may not
be able to recover his or her stolen property for some time if it was used
as an exhibit in the trial. Chapter 156 has added Section 1418.6 to
the Penal Code to remedy this problem in certain situations.
Upon the stipulation of the parties in a criminal case, the court may
now release exhibits to the owner or his or her agent if no prejudice
will be suffered by either party, and a full photographic record is made
of the released material. This section will not apply to material which
may not be legally possessed, or to weapons which the defendant had
in his or her possession at the time of arrest or used in the commission
of the crime for which he or she was convicted [CAL. PEN. CODE §1419.
COMMENT

Although Section 1418 also provides that a court "may" release the
evidence upon final disposition, the court in Franklinv. Municipal Court
[26 Cal. App. 3d 926, 103 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1972)] held that a judge
was required to return the material unless there were either conflicting
claims or the possession of the material was illegal [id. at 897, 103 Cal.
Rptr. at 362]. The court held that allowing a judge to use his or her
discretion in returning personal property was a violation of due process
[Id.]. Since Sections 1418 and 1418.6 are similar in that they are designed to return property to its owner, it would appear that if all the
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requirements of the new Section 1418.6 are met, a judge will have no
choice but to return evidentiary material before the final determination
of a criminal case. However, since it is the court who will determine
if these requirements have been met, a judge can still retain exhibits until
final disposition of a case by finding that the return of the exhibit will
result in prejudice to either the defendant or prosecution.
Criminal Procedure; mentally disordered jail inmates
Government Code §18862 (new); Penal Code §§4011.8, 6055
(new); §4011.6 (amended); Welfare and Institutions Code
§§1756.1, 5352.5, 5403, 5404.1, 5651.1, 7228 (new); §5328
(amended).
AB 1228 (Lanterman); STATS 1975, Ch 1258
Support: California Association for Mental Health; Los Angeles
County Conference of Local Mental Health Directors
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 4011.6 of the Penal Code,
whenever it appears to a person in charge of a jail or any judge in the
county in which the jail is located that an incarcerated person may be
mentally disordered, the jailor or judge may have the prisoner transferred to a mental health facility for a 72 hour period of treatment and
evaluation. After this transfer, the prisoner is subject to additional periods of involuntary confinement pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short
Act [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5000 et seq.]. Chapter 1258 has
amended Section 4011.6 to provide that a prisoner is now also subject
to conservatorship proceedings for gravely disabled persons [CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §5350 et seq.], if he meets the criteria for imposition of a conservatorship. Also, whenever a prisoner is transferred to
a mental health facility, the court must now notify both the prosecuting
attorney and counsel for the prisoner of such transfer. If the person
in charge of the mental health facility determines that arraignment or
trial would be detrimental to the well-being of the prisoner, statutory
time requirements for such proceedings are suspended. Unless such a
determination is made, statutory time requirements for arraignment or
trial in any pending criminal proceedings remain in effect.
Section 4011.8 has been added to the Penal Code to provide that a
prisoner may make an application for inpatient or outpatient mental
health care. Permission for such treatment, if it is to be undertaken
outside the jail, must be obtained from the person in charge of the jail
or a county judge in addition to the county mental health director. If
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criminal charges are pending, both counsel for the prisoner and the
prosecuting attorney must be notified by the court if approval for voluntary treatment is given. The denial of an application for voluntary treatment is reviewable only by mandamus. Furthermore, time spent in inpatient or outpatient treatment is to count as a part of the prisoner's
sentence.
Provision has been made by Chapter 1258 for the return of a prisoner
to jail to complete an unfinished term at the termination of treatment
(§4011.8). No provision is made for the release of a prisoner from
a treatment facility at the time his or her jail sentence expires; however,
in practice, the prisoner who has been receiving voluntary mental health
services is free to refuse further treatment and be released at that time
[Letter from Christopher J. Walt, Consultant, Assembly Ways and
Means Committee, to Pacific Law Journal, September 12, 1975 (on file
at the Pacific Law Journal)].

Section 5328 of the Welfare and Institutions Code delineates the
standards of confidentiality which apply to mental health records. Chapter 1258 has amended this section to allow a probation officer to receive
confidential treatment information, with the exception of information
which has been given in confidence by members of the prisoner's family.
Information released pursuant to this section may only be used for purposes of evaluation leading to a recommendation for sentencing after
written agreement has been made by the prisoner. Such information
is then transmitted to the court in a separate report; following sentencing
this report is permanently sealed.
Chapter 1258 has also added Section 5352.5 to the Welfare and Institutions Code to authorize the initiation of conservatorship proceedings
for the following persons: (1) those found not guilty by reason of insanity; (2) those found incompetent to stand trial; (3) those who have
been transferred from a jail to a mental health facility; (4) prison inmates who have been transferred to a state hospital; and (5) Youth Authority wards. It is specifically stated that the initiation or existence of
a conservatorship shall not affect any pending criminal proceeding.
Finally, Chapter 1258 has added Section 7228 to the Welfare and
Institutions Code to require an evaluation by the State Department of
Health of every person committed to a state hospital as not guilty by
reason of insanity, incompetent to stand trial, or as a mentally disordered
sex offender to determine his or her propensity for dangerous behavior
or escape. After such evaluation, any person so committed who does
not require a secure treatment setting must be treated in a state hospital
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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as near to the prisoner's home as possible. In the past, the Department
of Health has treated all persons committed pursuant to the Penal Code
or as mentally disordered sex offenders in two secure state hospitals,
Atascadero (San Luis Obispo County), and Patton (San Bernardino
County) [Final Report, Assembly Select Committee on Mentally Disordered Criminal Offenders, on file at the office of Asssemblyman Frank
Lanterman].
See Generally:
1)

2)

Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HAv. L.
REv. 1190 (1974).
Comment, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill in California: The LantermanPetris-ShortAct, 7 LOYOLA L. REv. 93 (1975).

Criminal Procedure; mentally disordered prisoners
Penal Code §§1026.1, 1370.3 (new); §§1026, 1026a, 1370, 1374
(amended); Welfare and Institutions Code §§5402.1, 5710.1,
6325.1 (new); §§6316, 6317, 6318, 6319, 6321, 6322, 6323, 6324,
6325, 6327, 6328, 6330, 7375 (amended).
AB 1229 (Lanterman); STATS 1975, Ch 1274
Support: California Association for Mental Health; Los Angeles
County Conference of Local Mental Health Directors
Opposition: California State Employees' Association
Chapter 1274 adds flexibility to the system of treating mentally ill
offenders by specifying procedures for local commitment and outpatient
treatment of such persons as alternatives to hospitalization. Detailed
procedures for outpatient care of persons found mentally incompetent
to stand trial, persons found not guilty by reason of insanity, and mentally disordered sex offenders (MDSO's) have been added to both the
Penal Code and the Welfare and Institutions Code. In addition,
MDSO's may now be placed in public or private mental health facilities
as an alternative to commitment to a state hospital.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1274, persons found incompetent
to stand trial were committed to a state hospital or local mental health
facility by order of the court at a hearing held to determine the defend-

ant's competency to stand trial

[CAL. PEN. CODE

§1370].

Once com-

mitted to the facility, the defendant could be placed on outpatient status
on the recommendation of the superintendent of the facility (§1374).
Persons found not guilty by reason of insanity were committed only to a
state hospital until sanity was restored (§1026), but could be released
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for outpatient care after court approval and following at least 90 days
of inpatient care for non-capital offenders or three years for capital offenders, provided that they were no longer a danger to the health and
safety of others [CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §7375 (c) ].
Chapter 1274 has amended Sections 1026 and 1370 and added Sections 1026.1 and 1370.3 (discussed infra) to the Penal Code to provide
that persons found incompetent to stand trial or found not guilty by reason of insanity may be placed by the court in a state hospital or other
mental health facility or placed on outpatient status. The order for
treatment may be issued by the court only after an evaluation of the defendant by the county mental health director or his designee. Furthermore, a person who has been charged with or convicted of certain violent crimes, such as murder or forcible rape, must undergo at least 90
days of evaluation and treatment before he or she can be placed on outpatient status.
If the superintendent of the state hospital or other facility to which
the defendant has been committed is of the opinion that the defendant
is not a danger to the health and safety of others and will benefit from
outpatient care, the defendant's status may be changed to that of outpatient through procedures delineated in Penal Code Section 1374 and
Welfare and Institutions Code Section 7375.
If the prosecuting attorney desires to challenge a decision to place a
defendant on outpatient status, a hearing must be held on the matter.
If the placement is approved, the outpatient supervisor is required to
provide a progress report to the court every 90 days [CAL. PEN. CODE
§§1026.1(a), 1370.3 (a), 1374(b); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §7375
(d) (1)]. The maximum period for outpatient care is one year, renewable by the court upon recommendation of the county mental health director or his designee, or the supervisor of the state hospital or other
facility [CAL. PEN. CODE §§1026.1(a), 1370.3(a), 1374(b); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §7375(d) (1)]. In addition, if at any time the
outpatient supervisor is of the opinion that a defendant on outpatient
status requires inpatient care, he or she must notify the committing
court, the prosecuting attorney, and the defendant's attorney of his or
her intent to transfer the patient to inpatient care. The court may disapprove of the transfer, approve it, or take no action, in which case the
transfer is deemed approved. The order for transfer is reviewable by
writ of habeas corpus only [CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1026.1 (c), 1370.3 (c),
1374(d); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §7375(d)(4)]. Alternatively,
if the prosecuting attorney is of the opinion that an outpatient defendPacific Law Journal Vol. 7
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ant is a danger to the health and safety of others, he or she may petition
the court for a hearing to determine whether outpatient treatment may
continue. At the hearing, the court may order the defendant committed
or returned to an inpatient facility, and this order is reviewable only by

writ of habeas corpus [CAL. PEN. CODE §§1026.1(d), 1370.3(d),
1374(e); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §7375(d)(4)]. While a transfer request made pursuant to this section is pending, the defendant may
be subjected to involuntary treatment procedures of the Lanterman-Pe-

tris-Short Act [CAL. PEN. CODE §§1026.1(e), 1370.3(e), 1374(f);
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §7375(d) (5)].
Welfare and Institutions Code Section 6300 et seq. provides for the
classification, commitment, and treatment of mentally disordered sex offenders. Section 6316 provides that if the court determines that a person is an MDSO, he or she may be committed to a state hospital for
an indefinite period of time. Chapter 1274 has amended this section
to provide that as an alternative to state hospital commitment, the court
may also, at its discretion, place the MDSO in an appropriate public
or private mental health facility after an evaluation of the MDSO by the
county mental health director or his designee. All other sections referring to treatment and care of an MDSO in a state hospital have also
been amended to reflect the alternative of care in a public or private
mental health facility.
Furthermore, procedures for transfer of MDSO's between state hospitals and other mental health facilities have been delineated by the addition of Section 6325.1 to the Welfare and Institutions Code. Either the
defendant or the prosecuting attorney may petition the court to contest
the transfer.
One of the most significant changes made by Chapter 1274 is the addition of procedures for outpatient treatment of MDSO's. In contrast
to the procedures used for persons found incompetent to stand trial or
not guilty by reason of insanity, an MDSO cannot be placed by the court
directly on outpatient treatment, but must first be committed by the
court to a state hospital or local mental health facility. The remaining
provisions concerning granting or revocation of outpatient status, progress reports, and the one-year maximum treatment period are identical
to those which apply to incompetent or insane defendants [CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE §6325.1]. Finally, the same prohibition against the release of an inpatient to outpatient status before 90 days of inpatient
treatment pursuant to Penal Code Sections 1026 and 1370 (supra) applies to an MDSO who has been found guilty of a specified violent crime
or an act which poses a threat of bodily harm to another.
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The ability of psychiatrists to predict with accuracy the dangerousness
of mental patients has been criticized as unreliable. Dangerousness has
sometimes been found in patients predicted as nondangerous; the opposite problem has also been pointed out [Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry
and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom,
62 CAL. L. REv. 693 (1974)]. As Chapter 1274 requires a determination of non-dangerousness before a patient may be released to outpatient status, an inaccurate determination may result in the release of dangerous individuals and the detention as inpatients of non-dangerous persons who could benefit from outpatient care and pose no threat to society. However, it appears that these considerations have been outweighed in the passage of this legislation by considerations of a genuine
need for outpatient services for defendants and the sufficiency of the
safeguards built into this legislation.
See Generally:
1) Parker, California'sNew Scheme for the Commitment of Individuals Found In-

2)

competent to Stand Trial, 6 PAc. L.J. 484 (1975) (Penal Code and Welfare and
Institutions Code treatment of defendants).
Note, Developments in the Law--Civil Commitment of the Mentally Il, 87 HAnv.
L. REv. 1190 (1974).
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